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| A view of Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley |
The Panjshir offensives (Russian: Пандшерская операция - Panjsher Operations) were a series of battles between the Soviet Army and groups of Afghan Mujahideen under Ahmad Shah Massoud for the control of the strategic Panjshir Valley, during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the period from 1980 to 1985.
These battles saw some of the most violent fighting of the whole war, but despite nine attacks the Soviets and their Afghan communist allies were not able to subdue the Panjshir.
A strategic objective
The Panjshir valley lies 70 km north of Kabul, in the Hindu Kush mountains close to the Salang pass, which connects Kabul to the northern areas of Afghanistan and further on to Uzbekistan, then part of the Soviet Union. In June 1979, an insurrection led by Ahmed Shah Massoud expelled all government forces, and the valley became a guerilla stronghold. From the Panjshir, Mujahideen groups frequently carried out ambushes against Soviet convoys bringing supplies to the 40th army stationed in Afghanistan. The Salang pass became a dangerous area, and Soviet truck drivers were even awarded decorations for having successfully crossed it.[1] The pressure on the logistic system determined the Soviet command to try and dislodge the rebels.
Soviet Strategy
Soviet offensives into the Panjshir Valley had three main tactical features. There was (1) the concentration of air assets, including extensive aerial bombardment of a target area followed by (2) the landing of helicopter forces to stop the withdrawal of enemy forces and engage the enemy from unexpected directions and (3) a drive by of mechanized forces into areas of guerrilla support in conjunction with the helicopter landing parties.[2] It was these kinds of tactics that caused so much destruction in the civilian populations in these regions and led many to call it genocide. By forcing the mass migration of civilians the Panjshir Valley and destroying all crops and livestock, the Soviets hoped to deprive Ahmad Shah Massoud of resources to sustain his full time fighters.
Shortcomings of Soviet Strategy
This tactic had some success as Massoud was forced to sign a cease fire treaty in January 1983 that would last for one year in order to rebuild his organization.[3] The bottom line though was that these victories were very temporary.[citation needed] There were serious issues with this tactic of large punitive offensives that contributed to the stalemate that characterized the war. Mujahideen forces would often learn of coming offensives in advance from their compatriots in the DRA army. Not only could civilians and guerrillas move safely out of the way of the majority of the bombs but guerrillas could also plan ambushes, lay mines, and move weapons caches. Once armored personnel carriers and helicopters came the guerrillas would retreat into the side valleys and carry out small ambushes rather than openly confront the Soviets.[citation needed
Aftermath
In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev announced his intention of withdrawing the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan. From then on the Soviets were mostly concerned with avoiding losses in the Panjshir sector, and they observed a tacit ceasefire: unprovoked shooting by Soviet troops was forbidden, and the Mujahideen refrained from attacking Soviet bases. Despite provocations ordered by Najibullah's government to draw the Soviets into further fighting, the situation generally remained calm, enabling Massoud to carry out his "strategic offensive", capturing much of Baghlan and Takhar provinces. The last Soviet and Afghan troops present in the lower Panjshir were finally evacuated in June 1988.[5]
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